Typical Worlds by Barrett, Jeffrey A.
TYPICAL WORLDS
JEFFREY A. BARRETT
Abstract. Hugh Everett III presented pure wave mechanics, sometimes re-
ferred to as the many-worlds interpretation, as a solution to the quantum
measurement problem. While pure wave mechanics is an objectively deter-
ministic physical theory with no probabilities, Everett sought to show how
the theory might be understood as making the standard quantum statistical
predictions as appearances to observers who were themselves described by the
theory. We will consider his argument and how it depends on a particular
notion of branch typicality. We will also consider responses to Everett and the
relationship between typicality and probability. The suggestion will be that
pure wave mechanics requires a number of significant auxiliary assumptions in
order to make anything like the standard quantum predictions.
1. introduction
It is tempting to claim that one can derive strong conclusions from weak assump-
tions, but there is a no-magic constraint. Since the conclusion of a valid deductive
argument cannot be stronger than the premises required to get it, if one gets a
strong conclusion, one must have made similarly strong assumptions somewhere
along the way. In practice, however, it is often difficult to say where.
Hugh Everett III (1955a, 1955b, 1956, 1957) presented pure wave mechanics, also
known as the many-worlds interpretation, as a solution to the quantum measure-
ment problem.1 While he believed that there was a sense in which one could derive
the standard quantum statistics from pure wave mechanics alone, his approach was
significantly less ambitious than deducing probabilistic predictions. That said, even
Everett’s relative weak account of quantum statistics requires significant additions
to pure wave mechanics.
Here we are concerned with Everett’s presentation of pure wave mechanics, his
derivation of the quantum statistics, and DeWitt’s and Graham’s response. We
will pay particular attention to the explanatory role played by alternative notions
of branch typicality and the relationship between typicality and probability. The
aim is to understand Everett’s approach better and to get a sense of the strength
of the auxiliary assumptions one would need to derive anything like the standard
quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics.2
The present paper seeks to get at what Everett thought about typicality and
probability, including his reaction to DeWitt and Graham’s criticisms. While there
are methodological morals to this story that clearly apply more generally, other
proposals for how to understand quantum typicality and probability require careful
1Everett himself did not refer to branches as worlds in his written work. See Barrett (2011b, 2016a)
for discussions of his metaphysical commitments and the role of metaphysics in interpreting pure
wave mechanics more generally.
2See Barrett (2016b) for a preliminary discussion of typicality in pure wave mechanics.
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analysis on their own terms.3 The present argument involves how one might best
identify a physical theory for the purpose of probabilistic explanation. Since it is
implausible that there are canonical criteria for how to individuate theories or for
what constitutes a good explanation, the approach will be thoroughly pragmatic.
How the methodological morals might be best applied beyond the story told here
is largely left to the reader.
2. pure wave mechanics
While pure wave mechanics is an objectively deterministic theory that says noth-
ing whatsoever about probability, Everett sought to describe a sense in which it
might be understood as making the same statistical predictions as the standard von
Neumann-Dirac collapse theory.4 The thought was to get the standard quantum
predictions as subjective appearances to observers who were themselves described
quantum-mechanically. What this meant for Everett was that the relative mea-
surement records of a typical relative observer will exhibit the standard quantum
statistics. In order to track the various auxiliary assumptions required, we will start
with a specification of pure wave mechanics.
Everett presented pure wave mechanics as a modification of the standard collapse
formulation of quantum mechanics. And, following von Neumann (1955), Everett
took the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics to be characterized
by the following principles:
1. Representation of States: The state of a physical system S is represented
by a vector |ψ〉S of unit length in a Hilbert space H.
2. Representation of Observables: A physical observable O is represented by
a set of orthogonal vectors O. These vectors represent the eigenstates of
the observable, each corresponding to a different value.
3. Dynamical Laws:
I. Linear dynamics: If no measurement is made, the system S evolves in a
deterministic linear way: |ψ(t1)〉S = Uˆ(t0, t1)|ψ(t0)〉S .
II. Nonlinear collapse dynamics: If a measurement is made, the system S
randomly, instantaneously, and nonlinearly jumps to an eigenstate of the
observable being measured: the probability of jumping to |φ〉S when O is
measured is |〈ψ|φ〉|2.
In addition to these principles, Everett appealed to the standard eigenvalue-
eigenstate link to attribute absolute properties to a system. In particular, a system
S has an absolute value for observable O if and only if |ψ〉S ∈ O, and the value is
given by the eigenvalue corresponding to |ψ〉S .
Everett believed, however, that its incompatible dynamical laws rendered the
von Neumann-Dirac collapse theory logically inconsistent and hence untenable. He
presented what he called the question of the consistency of the standard theory in
the context of an “amusing, but extremely hypothetical drama” (1956, 74).5 This
3Questions concerning the relationship between typicality and probability arise in other formu-
lations of quantum mechanics as well. For a recent discussion of typicality and probability in
Bohmian mechanics see Goldstein (2012).
4See Dirac (1930) and von Neumann (1932, 1955) for early descriptions of the standard collapse
theory.
5Everett was arguably too critical here. The theory as it stands is just ambiguous inasmuch
as one does not know precisely when to apply rules 3I and 3II. That is, one could remove the
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would later become known as the Wigner’s Friend story after Eugene Wigner (1961)
retold it without attribution to Everett.
A version of the story goes as follows. Suppose that a spin-1/2 system S begins
in the state
(1) α|↑x〉S + β|↓x〉S
and a friend F and his measuring device M begin ready to make a measurement
of the x-spin of S. Assuming perfect correlating interactions, the linear dynamics
(von Neumann’s Process 2, rule 3II above) predicts that the resultant state will be:
(2) α|“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M |↑x〉S + β|“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S .
In contrast, if one were to suppose, as suggested by the standard collapse theory,
that there is something special about the friend or his measuring device that causes
a collapse of the state of his object system on measurement, one would end up with
one of the states predicted by the collapse dynamics (von Neumann’s Process 1,
rule 3I above):
(3) |“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M |↑x〉S
or
(4) |“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S
with probabilities |α|2 and |β|2 respectively.
The moral of the story is that the two dynamical laws of the standard von-
Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics predict incompatible states
when applied to the same physical interaction. Further, as Everett explicitly rec-
ognized, state (2) is in principle empirically distinguishable from states (3) and (4)
by an inference measurement on the composite system consisting of F , M , and S.6
Everett held that one only has a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics
if one can provide a satisfactory account of such nested measurements. That is, if
one cannot tell the Wigner’s Friend story consistently, then one does not have a
satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics.
Everett believed that the Wigner’s Friend story could be told simply and consis-
tently in the context of pure wave mechanics, the theory one gets by starting with
the standard collapse theory and simply deleting the collapse dynamics (rule 3II).
In particular, he believed that the final state after F ’s measurement interaction is
simply given by state (2), thus removing the possibility of a contradiction. And,
again, he believed that an external observer would in principle be able to show this
empirically by an appropriate interference measurement on the composite system
threat of inconsistency by specifying strictly disjoint conditions for when each rule obtains. This
is what Wigner later sought to do. For his part, Everett assumed that a measuring device should
evolve linearly like every other physical system. It is this auxiliary assumption that yields the
inconsistency.
6This might be accomplished by measuring an observable that has state (2) and the orthogonal
state one gets by subtracting the second term rather than adding it to the first as eigenstates
corresponding to different eigenvalues.
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F , M , and S.7 But he also believed that it will appear to F that she has a perfectly
determinate measurement outcome, and, more generally, that one can recover the
standard quantum statistics for such appearances from pure wave mechanics alone.
He took pure wave mechanics thereby to provide a satisfactory resolution to the
quantum measurement problem.
As Everett described his project, “we shall deduce the probabilistic assertions of
[the collapse dynamics (3II)] as subjective appearances” to observers who are them-
selves treated as perfectly ordinary physical systems always subject to the linear
dynamics (3I) “thus placing the theory in correspondence with experience.” The
upshot is that “We are then led to the novel situation in which the formal theory is
objectively continuous and causal, while subjectively discontinuous and probabilis-
tic.” Everett took this to solve the nested measurement problem because “while
this point of view thus shall ultimately justify our use of the statistical assertions of
the orthodox view, it enables us to do so in a logically consistent manner, allowing
for the existence of other observers” (1956, 77–8). Specifically, this amounted to
describing a sense in which pure wave mechanics predicted the standard quantum
statistics for the relative measurement records of a typical relative observer.8
Everett’s first step in deriving the standard quantum statistics as typical was
to introduce a distinction between relative and absolute states. This distinction
plays an essential explanatory role in his relative-state formulation of pure wave
mechanics. While pure wave mechanics does not describe an observer as having
any particular absolute record after a typical measurement interaction, it does de-
scribe the observer as having a number of different relative records. In the case of
state (2), there exists, as Everett put it, a “cross section” of the total state where
each term describes a branch where both the friend and the measuring device have
determinate relative measurement records (1955a, 66–8). Namely, in the determi-
nate record basis, one term describes F as getting the relative result “↑x” (relative
to S being x-spin up) and the other describes F as getting the relative result “↓x”
(relative to S being x-spin down). Everett took the existence of branches where
an observer has determinate relative measurement records to explain the observer’s
determinate experience. As he put it to Abner Shimony some years later, “Each
individual branch looks like a perfectly respectable world where definite things have
happened” (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 275–6).9
7In other words, the linear dynamics entails that Everett worlds cannot be causally closed. This
point is also discussed in Albert (1986) and Albert and Barrett (1995), and a point that we will
return to later.
8There is a long tradition of physicists and philosophers who have sought as Everett did to deduce
the standard quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics. The list includes, among others,
Hartle (1968), DeWitt (1971), Graham (1973), Farhi, Goldstone and Gutmann (1989), Deutsch
(1999), Zurek (2005), Saunders (2010b), Wallace (2010b, 2012), and Sebens and Carroll (2016).
While the details of the arguments and precisely what is meant by quantum probability varies
significantly, each of these deductions relies on auxiliary assumptions that go beyond pure wave
mechanics, at least as Everett understood the theory.
9How things will look to a relative observer was for Everett a matter of the sequence of relative
records that the observer would have under the linear dynamics. Everett’s aim was to argue that
a typical relative observer will have records that are distributed the same way as the measurement
records we take ourselves to have. It is in this sense that he believed he could show that a typical
relative observer’s world would look perfectly ordinary.
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The sense in which Everett thought that each branch would look like a perfectly
respectable world requires care to sort out.10 For present purposes, we will simply
suppose that one can understand an observer’s experience as supervening on the
relative records characterized by a single branch in a determinate record basis for
that observer and turn to consider his deduction of the standard quantum statistics.
3. Everett’s deduction
In the Wigner’s friend story, the standard collapse theory predicts states (3)
and (4) after the measurement with probabilities |α|2 and |β|2 respectively. The
distribution of results one gets from a random process with these probabilities
represents the statistics Everett wanted to recapture in pure wave mechanics. The
problem is that pure wave mechanics simply predicts that the post-measurement
state is (2). Further, it predicts no stochastic events and there is no epistemic
uncertainty regarding what the absolute and relative states are after the interaction.
Hence pure wave mechanics alone makes no probabilistic predictions whatsoever.
It just tells what the final state will be, and the final state is not one where either
possible outcome has been realized at the exclusion of the other. Hence there is not
even a particular outcome for which |α|2 or |β|2 might have been the probabilities
before the measurement.
For his part, Everett clearly and repeatedly insisted that there were no proba-
bilities in pure wave mechanics, a view that is reflected in the original title of his
PhD thesis “Wave Mechanics without Probability” (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 72).
Rather than claim that his theory predicted the same chance events as predicted by
the collapse dynamics (von Neumann’s Process 1, rule 3II above), Everett argued
that it would appear to a typical relative observer that there had been such events.
More specifically, he argued that an observer’s relative measurement records in a
typical branch would be randomly distributed with the standard quantum proba-
bilities, in the measure of typicality provided by the norm-squared of the coefficient
associated with each branch in a determinate-record expansion of the total state.
The notion of a typical branch played an essential role in Everett’s account of
the standard quantum statistics. He took finding an appropriate typicality measure
for branches in pure wave mechanics to be analogous to the problem of finding an
appropriate typicality measure for states in statistical mechanics.
In order to establish quantitative results, we must put some sort of
measure (weighting) on the elements of a final superposition. This
is necessary to be able to make assertions which hold for almost all
of the observer states described by elements of a superposition. We
wish to make quantitative statements about the relative frequencies
of the different possible results of observation—which are recorded
in the memory—for a typical observer state; but to accomplish
this we must have a method for selecting a typical element from a
superposition of orthogonal states” (1956, 123–4; 1957, 190).
We will return to the analogy with statistical mechanics later.
Everett’s strategy was to impose a sequence of desirable constraints until a par-
ticular typicality measure over branches was uniquely determined. Importantly, he
10See Barrett (1999, 2011a, 2011b, 2015) for discussions.
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did not argue that almost all branches by count will exhibit the standard quan-
tum statistics. Rather, he argued that almost all branches in a natural measure m
given the mathematical structure of pure wave mechanics will exhibit the standard
quantum statistics.
While he clearly and repeatedly reminded the reader that his typicality mea-
sure m did not represent probabilities, he also explicitly took advantage of the fact
that it satisfied the formal conditions for being a probability measure over the set of
branches B determined by a specified orthogonal decomposition of the state (1956,
79–80, 127). In particular, the set function m assigns a number between zero and
one to each subset of B such that (1) m(B) = 1, (2) m(Q) = 1−m(Q¯) for subset Q,
(3) if R ∩Q = ∅, then m(R ∪Q) = m(R) +m(Q) for subsets Q and R, and (4) m
is countably additive for countable unions of disjoint subsets of B.
Beyond this, Everett’s first constraint was that m be a positive function of
the complex-valued coefficients ai associated with the branches of the superpo-
sition
∑
ai|χi〉. This may seem natural enough inasmuch as, short of just counting
the branches and considering relative proportions, one might argue that pure wave
mechanics itself does not provide much else that one might use as a typicality
measure over branches.11
That said, there are many functions of the coefficients ai one might consider. His
second constraint addressed this in part by requiring that m be a function of the
amplitudes of the coefficients alone. The reason he gave was that the coefficients
on branches ai can only be empirically determined up to an arbitrary phase factor.
Finally, he stipulated a sub-branch additivity condition. Since any collection of
branches bi of the total state can be considered to be a single branch b
∗ on a different
orthogonal decomposition of the state, he required that the measure assigned to b∗
be equal to the sum of the measures assigned to the branches bi. Synchronically,
this provides a natural nesting relation between the typicality measures assigned
to branches on different cross sections. Diachronically, it ensures a conservation
of typicality of branches under the linear dynamics that Everett found attractive.
Regarding this diachronic consideration, he explained,
[W]e wish to make statements about ‘trajectories’ of observers.
However, for us a trajectory is constantly branching (transform-
ing from state to superposition) with each successive measurement.
To have a requirement analogous to the ‘conservation of probabil-
ity’ in the classical case, we demand that the measure assigned to
a trajectory at one time shall equal the sum of the measures of its
separate branches at a later time. This is precisely the additiv-
ity requirement which we imposed and which leads uniquely to the
choice of square-amplitude measure. Our procedure is therefore
quite as justified as that of classical statistical mechanics (1956,
126; 1957, 192).
Insofar as Everett had in mind an analogy between the conservation of probabil-
ity over non-splitting trajectories in classical statistical mechanics as described by
11But even this first move of requiring that one’s typicality measure be a function of branch
amplitudes is in no way forced on us by the theory. As David Albert (2010, 360) argues, one
could take one’s typicality measure to be a function of the basis elements describing the branches.
Albert’s specific suggestion is that one might take the most natural measure over branches to be
a function of how fat one is in each branch if that is what one cares about most.
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Liouville’s theorem (which he explicitly mentions here) and the conservation of typ-
icality over splitting branches in pure wave mechanics, it is unclear precisely how
he intended for it to go. What he said is that such a conservation condition is “the
only choice which makes possible any reasonable statistical deductions at all” (1956,
125; 1957, 192). Among the diachronic deductions one can get given the sub-branch
additivity condition is that, given a specified initial branch where a measurement
interaction occurs b, if one assumes no interference between descendent branches,
then the typicalities associated with the descendent branches behave like a proba-
bility measure conditional on the state of b. One need not require that a typicality
measure have this property, but it is unsurprising that sub-branch additivity seemed
natural to Everett.
Together, he took the three stipulated constraints together with the properties
of a probability measure to determine uniquely the typicality measure m as the
norm-squared-amplitude measure on branches.12
It was important to Everett that m did not represent branch probabilities. In-
deed, inasmuch as all branches are equally actual, he took the probability of each
branch to be one. And since they were each in principle observable, they were
actual.
Take this opportunity to caution against a certain viewpoint which
can lead to difficulties. This is the idea that, after an apparatus
has contracted with the system, in ‘actuality one or another of the
elements of the resultant superposition described by the composite
state-function has been realized to the exclusion of the rest, the
existing one simply being unknown to the external observer . . . .
This position must be erroneous since there is always the possibil-
ity for the external observer to make use of interference properties
between elements of the superposition. (1956, 149)
There is, then, no actualization of one measurement outcome at the exclusion of
the rest. They are all equally actual.
This point is closely tied to Everett’s view that in the Wigner’s Friend story the
external observer may always in principle perform a measurement that would show
that the system containing the friend F is in the superposition (2) predicted by the
linear dynamics. All branches are equally actual precisely because Everett believed
that it was always in principle possible to observe interference effects between them.
As he put the point, It is . . . improper to attribute any less validity or reality to
any element of a superposition than any other element, due to [the] ever present
possibility of obtaining interference effects between the elements. All elements of
a superposition must be regarded as simultaneously existing (1956, 150). And
it is a direct consequence of this that, contrary to the understanding of many
Everettians, the reality of branches for Everett did not in any way depend on
the selection of a preferred basis or on special decoherence conditions obtaining.13
12Everett originally just wanted to argue that his choice of typicality measure was “not as arbitrary
as it appears.” Some years later, when editing his thesis for inclusion in the DeWitt and Graham
(1973) anthology, he changed the text to read instead “there is a unique measure which will satisfy
our requirements” Barrett and Byrne (2012, 359).
13See Wallace (2010a, 69–71) for a recent reading of the metaphysical role of decoherence in the
Everett interpretation.
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Indeed, decoherence only serves to make it more difficult to show empirically that
all the branches predicted by the linear dynamics are in fact equally actual.
Returning to his choice of typicality measure, while m may seem a natural mea-
sure given the structure of pure wave mechanics, it is clearly not the only measure
Everett might have chosen. Indeed, as we will see in the next section, some of Ev-
erett’s strongest supporters believed that he had chosen the wrong measure. While
there are more and less natural candidates, there is no canonical way to assign a
measure over branches. Hence, Everett’s choice of typicality measure is an addition
to the theory.
For his part, Everett took measure m to be necessary for talking sensibly about
the statistical properties of typical branches. The main result of his thesis was that
almost all branches in measure m will exhibit the standard quantum statistics in the
limit as the number of measurements one has performed gets large. This was the
fact that he took to be most significant in understanding pure wave mechanics.14
Consider a measuring device M that is ready to make and record the results
of an infinite series of measurements on each of an infinite series of systems Sk in
initial state
(5) α|↑x〉Sk + β|↓x〉Sk .
Suppose that M interacts with each system in turn and perfectly correlates its kth
memory register with the x-spin of system Sk by the linear dynamics. This will
produce an increasingly complicated entangled superposition of different sequences
of measurement outcomes. After one measurement, the state of M and S1 in the
determinate record basis will be
(6) α|“↑”〉M |↑〉S1 + β|“↓”〉M |↓〉S1 .
After two measurements, the state of M , S1, and S2 will be
(7)
α2|“↑↑”〉M |↑〉S1 |↑〉S2 + αβ|“↑↓”〉M |↑〉S1 |↓〉S2
+ βα|“↓↑”〉M |↓〉S1 |↑〉S2 + β2|“↓↓”〉M |↓〉S1 |↓x〉S2 .
Figure 1 illustrates the first three steps of the branching process and the amplitudes
associated with each branch.
↵|"i
↵2|""i ↵ |"#i  ↵|#"i  2|##i
 |#i
↵3|"""i ↵2 |""#i ↵ 2|"##i↵2 |"#"i  2↵|##"i ↵2|#""i  2↵|#"#i  3|###i
Using this setup, Everett (1956, 127) provided a rough sketch of the proof of the
following theorem :
14See his discussion of this at the Xavier conference. Here Everett again describes the analogy
with classical statistical mechanics (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 274–5).
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Relative Frequency. For any δ > 0 and  > 0, there exists a k such that af-
ter k measurements the sum of the norm-squared of the amplitude associated with
each branch where the distribution of spin-up results is within  of |α|2 and the
distribution of spin-down results is within  of |β|2 is within δ of one.
And he hinted at something like the following (1956, 127–8):
Randomness. The sum of the norm-squared of the amplitude associated with each
branch where the sequence of relative records is algorithmically incompressible, or
satisfies any other of the standard criteria for being random, goes to one as the
number of measurements gets large.
Both of these results can be proven for pure wave mechanics with modest aux-
iliary assumptions.15 In this sense, it is fair to conclude with Everett that in the
limit as the number of measurements gets large, almost all branches in measure m
will describe sequences of measurement records that are randomly distributed with
the standard quantum statistics.
He then proceeded to argue that one should expect a similar result to hold for
any situation where one is performing a series of repeated quantum measurements
regardless of whether they produced perfect correlations or concerned repeated
measurements of the same observable (1956, 129–30). He thus concluded that
the relative measurement records of a typical relative observer will exhibit the
standard quantum statistics in the limit. Hence it would appear to the typical
relative observer that the standard quantum probabilities obtain for the results of
her measurements. This was Everett’s deduction of the standard quantum statistics
from pure wave mechanics.
4. Indifference and a new partition
Everett held that our quantum experience is fully explained by the fact that the
relative records of a typical relative observer, in the sense of typical specified, will
exhibit the standard quantum statistics. But even many his supporters found this
explanation unsatisfactory.
Bryce DeWitt (1971) and Neill Graham (1973) argued that Everett’s choice of
typicality measure was unmotivated. Their worry was that it is typically not the
case that the records of most relative observers by count will exhibit the standard
quantum statistics. As Graham put it, “it is extremely difficult to see what signif-
icance such a measure can have when its implications are completely contradicted
by a simple count of the worlds involved” (1973, 236).
What DeWitt and Graham wanted was a theory where most worlds by count
exhibit the standard quantum statistics. Only then did they believe that one would
have a satisfactory explanation for why one should expect one’s experiments to
exhibit the standard quantum statistics. To this end, Graham stipulated a rule for
how worlds split such that the number of worlds that exhibit a particular outcome
after a measurement interaction was proportional to the square of the coefficient
on the term describing that outcome. This ad hoc splitting procedure ensured that
almost all worlds by simple count will exhibit the standard quantum statistics.16
15See Barrett (1999) for a discussion of the sort of assumptions one needs regarding the properties
of limiting states to get such results and Albert (2010, 357) for a recent discussion of the theorem.
16Graham presented his “two step” splitting procedure as an extension of what he called Everett’s
“one step” account of measurement. On Graham’s account, one introduces a third macroscopic
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We know what Everett thought of DeWitt’s criticism and Graham’s proposal
from his marginal notes on his personal copy of the DeWitt-Graham (1973) an-
thology. Where DeWitt (1971, 185) claimed that Everett’s typicality argument
was unsatisfying, Everett wrote in the margin “only to you!” And where Graham
(1973, 236) claimed that Everett’s typicality measure was unmotivated, Everett
wrote in the margin “bullshit.”17
Everett was certainly free to use any measure he wanted—it just needed to be a
measure that allowed him to argue that the relative records in a typical branch will
exhibit the standard quantum statistics. Further, as we have seen, the measure he
used, while in no way canonical, has a natural feel to it given the formal structure
of pure wave mechanics.
That DeWitt and Graham believed that making something true of most branches
by count was the only way to explain why an observer should expect his results to
exhibit the standard quantum statistics tells us something about their background
commitments. To begin, they took the talk of worlds somehow inhabited by copies
of the observer seriously, arguably much more seriously than Everett himself did.18
Second, they seem to have wanted standard probabilistic predictions from the the-
ory, something that Everett did not seek to provide. And finally, their intuitions
were apparently guided by a principle of indifference, the sense that if there are
n possibilities, then, in the absence of other information, one should assign proba-
bility 1/n to each possibility.19
An account of quantum probabilities along these lines might go something like
this. The overwhelming majority of quantum worlds by simple count exhibit the
standard quantum statistics on the new stipulated partition. Since each world is
equally likely, one should thus with high probability expect to find that one’s actual
measurement results exhibit the standard quantum statistics.
There are, however, several problems with this line of argument. First, it is
unclear precisely what such quantum probabilities are probabilities of. Since there
are no chance events nor uncertainties stipulated by pure wave mechanics, the
theory itself does not provide an candidate for what they might refer to. Even if one
adds a preferred partition of worlds, inasmuch as there is a copy of the observer in
each of the post-measurement worlds, one would need to explain why the probability
of finding the observer in any particular world is something other than one. One
option is to try to make sense of self-location probabilities. The idea here would
be that since most quantum worlds by simple count exhibit the standard quantum
statistics on Graham’s partition, one should with high probability expect to find
one’s self in a world where one’s measurement results exhibit the standard quantum
statistics. This strategy would require one to say both how one assigns probabilities
and to what one assigns them, which means making substantive additions to the
apparatus that mediates between a microscopic system and a macroscopic observer, then comes
to thermodynamically equilibrium with its environment. The partition of branches that he stipu-
lated for the resulting state differs from the determinate-record partition that Everett derived by
assuming that the linear dynamics fully described the measurement interaction.
17See Barrett and Byrne (2012, 365–6) for photocopies of these pages.
18See Barrett (2011b) for a discussion of Everett’s metaphysical views.
19There are a number of discussions of difficulties one encounters in applying the principle of
indifference to branches in the literature. See, for examples, Barrett (1999, 168–73) and, more
recently, Greaves (2007).
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theory. If this is what they had in mind, neither DeWitt nor Graham explain how
to do it.20
A second problem is that the content of a principle of indifference always de-
pends on one’s choice of a partition. Bas van Fraassen’s (1989) cube factory story
illustrates the point. Suppose one only knows that a factory produces cubes with a
side between 0 and 2 meters. If one considers side-length, one might imagine that
a principle of indifference requires that one take the probability of a randomly se-
lected cube having a side between 0 and 1 to be 1/2 since side-lengths range from 0
to 2. If one considers volume, one might imagine that a principle of indifference
requires that one take the probability of a randomly selected cube having a volume
between 0 and 1 to be 1/4 since volumes range from 0 to 4. But since having
a side length between 0 and 1 is the same thing as having a volume between 0
and 1, the different partitions, each perfectly natural given different interests, yield
inconsistent probabilities. The upshot is that the content of a principle of indif-
ference depends on one’s partition of a space of possibilities, different partitions
yield inconsistent probability assignments, and what partitions one finds natural
often just depend on one’s interests. For this reason, applications of the principle
of indifference are often clearly ad hoc given the proposed partition.
Since pure wave mechanics specifies no canonical decomposition of the full state,
it does not tell one what set of branches one should use in assigning each branch
probability 1/n.21 This problem is made particularly salient by the fact that choos-
ing a determinate-record basis in order to guarantee that each relative observer has
determinate measurement records then assigning each branch probability 1/n typ-
ically yields the wrong quantum probabilities. DeWitt and Graham must assume
both a special, preferred way to individuate branches and a principle of indiffer-
ence even to get started in deriving the standard quantum probabilities. Further,
stipulating precisely the right number of duplicate worlds to get the right quantum
probabilities on a principle of indifference is manifestly ad hoc.
It is important to be clear on this point. If one individuates branches in the
determinate-record basic as Everett did, supposing that there is one branch for
each different relative sequence of measurement results then assigns unbiased priors
by appeal to a principle of indifference, one gets the wrong quantum probabilities.
Hence even an appeal to a standard sort of unbiased principle of indifference is not
enough to get the standard quantum probabilities. If one wants to ground one’s
probability assignment in a principle of indifference one must either adjust how one
20Self-location probabilities are a recurring topic in Saunders, Barrett, Kent, and Wallace (eds)
(2010). See also Vaidman (2012). Albert and Loewer’s (1988) single- and many-minds theories
illustrate the sort of assumptions regarding probabilities and what they concern that one would
need to add to pure wave mechanics to make sense of self-location probabilities. We will briefly
discuss these theories later.
21Indifferent priors are sometimes suggested as a way of representing a complete lack of initial
information. But judgments of lack of information are also relative to one’s interests. If one is
interested in information regarding side length, one partition may seem more natural; if one is
interested in information regarding volume, another partition may. Similarly, in the context of pure
wave mechanics, if one is interested in information regarding determinate measurement records,
one decomposition of the absolute state may seem more natural; if one is interested in information
regarding energy another decomposition may. And, as we just saw, the application of a principle
of indifference over different partitions typically yields incoherent probability assignments.
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individuates branches or adopt an exotic principle of indifference that provides the
standard probabilities to each branch as Everett individuated them.22
If one stipulates that the simple proportion of branches with a particular property
is equal to the quantum probabilities for the property, then applies a principle of
indifference, one will clearly get the standard quantum predictions. But there is no
mystery about what does the work here. One gets the right predictions out because
one put them in by stipulating how to count worlds. Similarly, if one individuates
branches like Everett did but stipulates that the probability of each branch is equal
to the norm-squared coefficient associated with the branch, one will also get the
standard quantum predictions. And here there is even less of a mystery. One gets
the right predictions out because one is simply assigning the standard quantum
probabilities to each branch. That DeWitt and Graham disagreed with Everett
concerning both the appropriate partition and the appropriate measure is evidence
that neither is canonical, and that both stipulations nevertheless yield the standard
quantum measure over branches is evidence of each being ad hoc. The upshot is
that one can get the standard quantum probabilities by making an ad hoc choice
for how branches are individuated and/or an ad hoc choice for one’s probability
measure over branches.
That one’s partition and probability measure necessarily work together has impli-
cations for the status of a principle of indifference. Inasmuch as the directive to as-
sign probabilities of 1/n to each of n possibilities does not mean anything apart from
a choice of partition, it cannot be a basic principle of reason. Further, insofar as one
believes that there is no canonical way of partitioning possibilities that applies over
all domains of application, no principle-of-indifference/partition pair can be adopted
as a basic principle of reason either. The next step might be to imagine that the
basic principle of reason consists in a principle-of-indifference/partition/domain-of-
application triple, but it is difficult to imagine how a three-parameter principle of
indifference could fail to look ad hoc.
To be sure, people often claim that there are canonical partitions and canonical
probability measures over those partitions even as they disagree with each other
regarding what the canonical partitions and measures are. One need not look
far for a plausible diagnosis. An inquirer might assign any set of coherent, non-
dogmatic priors to the n hypotheses she is considering without fear of finding herself
committed to a Dutch book or failing to respond appropriately to relevant evidence.
That a rational inquirer enjoys this freedom illustrates why there can be no basic
principle of reason requiring any particular assignment of priors. She might assign
a probability of 1/n to each hypothesis, but only if the partition represented by her
hypotheses in fact yields unbiased degrees of belief given her actual commitments.
Otherwise, she would be open to a Dutch book. In short, a rational inquirer must
assign those credences to which she finds herself currently committed to each of
her n hypotheses, whatever they may be. Of course, she may take a partition where
each hypothesis gets the same probability given her credences to be particularly
natural. If so, what may look like an application of a principle of indifference is
22Sebens and Carroll (2016) pursue this second strategy. They argue that while “it is tempting to
regard each branch as equiprobable . . . the temptation should be resisted.” Rather, they believe
that assigning the standard quantum probabilities to each branch constitutes “the uniquely ratio-
nal way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics.” To get this, they appeal to
something they call the Strong Epistemic Separability Principle, a new basic principle of reason
that they take to be a generalized principle of indifference.
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just a result of the choice of a symmetric partition given the agent’s prior epistemic
commitments.23
It is unsurprising that we find those partitions and measures that yield the
empirically warranted probabilities natural. But if one wants the standard quantum
probabilities from pure wave mechanics, one needs significant auxiliary assumptions.
And, given that pure wave mechanics does nothing to constrain even a measure of
typicality over branches, such assumptions are not well-characterized as necessary
constraints on reason.
While this is a different sort of problem, it is also worth noting a technical issue
that arises when one tries to apply a principle of indifference in the case of pure
wave mechanics. If one insists that there are only a finite number of worlds, then
a principle of indifference cannot provide precisely the same fine-grained quantum
statistics as predicted by the standard theory. But if one allows a countably infinite
number of worlds and assumes sigma-additivity for the measure over those worlds
(assumption 4 in the list of conditions above), then there can be no unbiased priors
at all. In this case, a principle of indifference does not even make sense.24
For his part, Everett had no use for a principle of indifference inasmuch as he
did not want or need probabilities over branches. Rather, his account of quantum
probabilities concerned what it would look like to a relative observer in a typical
branch, and the argument was that it would look as if a random process had gen-
erated the records in accord with the quantum probabilities. In this sense, he was
concerned with describing the properties of typical, not probable, branches. To
get probabilities over branches, one would need to supplement Everett’s account
with something that allows one to move from what is true in a typical branch to
which branches are probable or to be expected together with an account of what such
probabilities or expectations concern, and that would require auxiliary assumptions
that go well beyond pure wave mechanics.
DeWitt and Graham seem to have wanted an explanation that addressed the
question of what branch properties one should expect. But, if so, they clearly
failed to deliver it. At the end of the paper where he criticizes Everett’s choice
of measure and introduces his new unbiased measure and partition of branches,
Graham senses that he has not fully addressed the issue.
Thus we conclude that values of the relative frequency near [the
standard predictions] will be found in the majority of Everett worlds
of the apparatus and observer. If we assume our own world to be
a “typical” one, then we may expect a human or mechanical ob-
server to perceive relative frequencies in accord with the [standard
predictions]. Why we should be able to assume our own world to
be typical is, of course, itself an interesting question, but one that
is beyond the scope of the present paper. (1973, 252)
23See Barrett (2014) for a signaling-game account of how a descriptive partition and an assignment
of effective priors might coevolve. The model illustrates how a rich set of effective priors might
evolve by means of precisely the same process by which one comes to have a reliable descriptive
language. Such effective priors may evolve to be unbiased over the evolved descriptions on this
sort of model if agents are, for some reason, rewarded for using maximally informative signals.
24It is presumably for this reason that both Graham (1973, 251–2) and Sebens and Carroll (2016)
require the number of Everett worlds be finite.
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What Graham reports as being beyond the scope of the paper is why one should
expect a principle of indifference to hold over worlds. But without that one cannot
have anything like a deduction of standard quantum probabilities over branches,
which begs the question as to the sense in which his partition is in any way preferable
to Everett’s in accounting for our experience.
The upshot is that whether one appeals to Everett’s norm-squared coefficient
measure m or to the unbiased indifference measure that Graham favors, one further
needs to assume that the actual world is probably typical in order to get something
like the standard quantum predictions from pure wave mechanics. The most direct
way to accomplish this would be to add (1) a choice of partition, (2) a typicality
measure over the partition, and (3) the assumption that the actual world is somehow
randomly selected by probabilities determined by that measure to one’s specification
of the theory. But, again, there is good reason to suppose that Everett himself
took it to be enough simply to establish that there is a sense in which the standard
quantum statistics hold for a typical sequence of relative measurement records.25
5. The Everettian circle
While Everett was free to use any typicality measure he wanted to make his
argument, by this point one might suspect that there was nevertheless something
ad hoc in his choice. The issue is perhaps clearest if one imagines that one’s
goal is somehow to deduce the probabilities that result from the standard collapse
formulation of quantum mechanics as probabilities over branches, but the worry
also holds if one considers Everett’s more modest goal of just deducing the standard
quantum statistics as typical.
In pure wave mechanics, a typical branch in the norm-squared coefficient mea-
sure m exhibits the standard quantum statistics. That is, if one were to randomly
select a branch with probabilities determined by the norm-squared coefficient mea-
sure m, one would expect to select a branch where the measurement records agree
with the standard quantum statistics. But this fact is entirely unsurprising since a
random selection of a branch with probabilities equal to this measure is precisely
what the standard collapse dynamics accomplishes were one to perform a measure-
ment on the final entangled state resulting from a series of correlating interactions.
And the determinate records one expects to be produced by the collapse dynamics
are what one means by the standard quantum statistics.
Put another way, since the measure Everett associated with each branch is just
the standard quantum probability assigned to the sequence of measurement out-
comes represented by that branch, if one were to randomly select a branch in that
measure, one would be randomly selecting a branch with the standard quantum
probabilities, which is precisely what the collapse dynamics does in the standard
theory. Most simply, since Everett took the standard probability measure over
branches to be his typicality measure, interpreting Everett’s typicalities as proba-
bilities, directly yields the standard probabilities over branches. The consequence
is that if one modifies pure wave mechanics by stipulating that a particular branch
is somehow randomly selected in measure m as actual, one’s new theory simply
recapitulates the explanation of quantum statistics given by the standard collapse
theory.
25But, as discussed in Barrett (2015), one might require significantly more than Everett did from
a satisfactory account of the standard quantum statistics.
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Further, since Everett’s measure over branches is just the standard quantum
probabilities over the sequences of measurement results represented by the branches,
the fact that almost all branches in that measure exhibit the standard quantum
statistics in the limit as one performs more measurements follows directly from the
fact that the standard quantum statistics will almost certainly be exhibited by a
branch selected from the state in the limit with the standard quantum probabilities.
The only point of interest here is that one gets the same expected statistics applying
the collapse dynamics once after a series of linear measurement-like interactions as
one gets applying it after each of a series of linear measurement-like interactions.26
But this is already an essential feature of the standard collapse theory. If this were
not the case, then the standard theory would make entirely the wrong empirical
predictions with the immediate consequence that it would be easy to determine
which measurement-like interactions caused collapses and which did not.
The upshot is that if one understands Everett’s typicality measure as giving the
probability of each branch in fact being realized, then one gets the same predic-
tions as the standard collapse theory and for precisely the same reason. One might
try to avoid ending up where one started by taking Everett’s measure to repre-
sent self-location probabilities rather than branch realization probabilities. On this
view, while all of the branches are equally actual, one stipulates that the prob-
ability of finding oneself in a particular branch is given by the Everett measure
associated with that branch. Albert and Loewer’s (1988) single- and many-minds
theories provide a strategy for making sense of such self-location probabilities. On
their account, which they present as a way of understanding Everett, an observer’s
physical state evolves on the standard unitary dynamics while Everett’s measure m
gives probabilities for the random evolution of the observer’s mind(s). That is,
instead of a collapse randomly selecting a branch to be realized, an observer’s mind
is randomly associated with the measurement records associated with a particular
branch with probabilities given by m.27
But shifting to self-location probabilities does not represent much of an advance.
The standard collapse probabilities are probabilities for randomly realizing a branch
corresponding to a particular set of determinate measurement records. Similarly,
self-location probabilities are probabilities for randomly finding oneself associated
with a branch that corresponds to a particular set of determinate measurement
records. Hence, appropriating collapse probabilities for self-location yields the same
quantum statistics as the standard collapse account and, again, for the same reason.
In this sense, understanding Everett’s measure m as providing self-location proba-
bilities is arguably as ad hoc as understanding it as providing collapse probabilities.
26A measurement-like interaction here is just one that correlates the pointer variable on one’s
measuring device with a property of the object system by means of the linear dynamics.
27While the Albert and Loewer single- and many-minds formulations of quantum mechanics are
ontologically extravagant, they have the virtue of making it clear what self-location probabilities
concern: they are probabilities that a particular mind will become associated with a particular
branch. If one wants a more metaphysically modest account of self-location probabilities, one
has the challenge of being similarly clear regarding how they are to be understood. See Barrett
(1999) for a discussion of the explanatory tradeoffs on accounts like Albert and Loewer’s. In
short, there is little to recommend their strategy beyond its clarity and that it makes the right
probabilistic predictions and agrees with Everett’s sense of what would happen if one could perform
an interference measurement of one’s friend and his measuring device and object system in a
Wigner’s Friend experiment.
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That said, what matters more than the circularity of the choice of measure for
the present argument is that making sense of self-location probabilities requires
significant auxiliary assumptions concerning what self-location consists in and the
relevance of quantum probabilities to where one finds oneself. The strength of the
auxiliary assumptions required is concretely illustrated by what Albert and Loewer
add to pure wave mechanics to get a clear account of self-location probabilities
in single- and many-minds theories. More generally, in order to make sense of a
random branch selection process one must make it clear precisely what the selection
consists in and the relevance of the standard quantum probabilities to that selection.
One might concede the need for such auxiliary assumptions but insist that they
are especially natural. After all, one might argue, Everett chose his typicality
measure because it had special formal properties, not because it was the standard
probability measure over measurement outcomes and hence was sure to yield the
standard quantum statistics as typical. But, if one wants to deduce the standard
quantum probabilities, it is difficult to see the special methodological virtue of (i)
pointing out that measure m has a number of suitable formal properties, then stip-
ulating that m represents the standard quantum probabilities over (ii) stipulating
that m represents the standard quantum probabilities, then noting that it has a
number of suitable formal properties. In each case, one is taking the measure that
one already knows from the success of the standard collapse theory will yield the
right empirical predictions and stipulating that it represents quantum probabilities.
To insist that one’s real reason for the stipulation is purely formal is unconvincing
when any other choice would entail the wrong predictions. This is not to say that
one doesn’t believe that one’s aesthetic judgments concerning what is most natural
given the formal structure of the theory are pure and consequently independent of
pragmatic demands. Rather, empirical psychology provides good reason to sup-
pose that we are particularly unreliable in judging how we form judgments in just
such contexts.28 Further, it unclear, at least to me, that judgments made here on
purely aesthetic grounds are somehow more virtuous than those made from prag-
matic necessity. Indeed, on reflection, it is unclear why one should expect aesthetic
judgments to track truth at all here.
The point is not that one should use something other than m to assign quan-
tum probabilities to possible measurement outcomes. If one insists on having the
standard probabilistic predictions, then one might take the linear dynamics to de-
scribe the time-evolution of all physical systems and stipulate the standard collapse
probabilities as something like self-location probabilities, filling in other significant
background assumptions as one goes. But if so, one cannot seriously maintain that
one is getting one probabilistic predictions from pure wave mechanics alone.
6. Methodological Considerations
It is unsurprising that reason alone cannot determine the standard quantum
probabilities. In fact, it is entirely the other way around. Our experience of the
behavior of quantum systems has proven to be deeply counterintuitive. One would
never have guessed what the statistical properties of our quantum records would
be before performing the appropriate experiments.
28While much has been done to study such phenomena since, the classic survey article is Nisbett
and Wilson (1977).
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It is also unsurprising that one cannot derive the standard quantum probabilities
from pure wave mechanics alone. The theory says nothing about probability. The
unitary dynamics does not by itself require that one’s measurement records exhibit
any particular set of statistical properties. Indeed, pure wave mechanics does not
even suggest a preferred typicality measure over branches or that any one result is
realized at the expense of the others. While some measures may seem more natural
than others given the empirical results we know we need to explain, that pure wave
mechanics does not entail anything like a canonical measure can be seen in the
disagreement between Everett and DeWitt and Graham concerning what measure
is more natural. Everett knew that one might consider other measures. In the
original version of his thesis he just wanted to argue that his choice of typicality
measure was “not as arbitrary as it appears” (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 359).
If one wants anything like probabilities over branches from pure wave mechanics,
one needs significant auxiliary assumptions. Further, if one insists on claiming
that one can deduce quantum probabilities from one’s physical theory alone, then
honesty requires that one include these auxiliary assumptions in the specification
of the theory.
The general methodological issue concerns what explanatory assumptions one
has an obligation to include in one’s specification of a theory. It would clearly be
a mistake to include everything in one’s theory that one might in fact use when
giving theoretical explanations. One might implicitly or explicitly assume a good
deal of mathematics, that one is not hallucinating, various boundary conditions, etc.
without adding such assumptions to one’s specification of the explanatory theory.
Closer to the present argument, while our physical theories typically say nothing
explicit about experience, we nevertheless often take them to make predictions
about experience. By analogy one might argue that while pure wave mechanics
says nothing about probability, we might nevertheless take it to make probabilistic
predictions.29 Addressing this line of argument requires one to take a stand on
when and how a theory explains.
We typically do not feel the need to add principles that stipulate the relationship
between physical states and experience to our physical theories. Rather, we take
a theory to make the right empirical predictions if it predicts determinate physical
records on which one’s experience might plausibly be taken to supervene. But, that
said, when there is no straightforward supervenience relation at hand, we sometimes
do explicitly stipulate a relationship between physical states and experience as a
part of the specification of a physical theory. Indeed, that is just what Albert and
Loewer’s do in their single- and many-mind theories. The reason is that they want
to account for the determinate experiences of observers when the physical state is
the one predicted by the unitary dynamics and hence typically provides no clear
candidate for something on which the experience of a determinate measurement
outcome might supervene.30 By analogy, the suggestion is that one needs to add
explicit assumptions regarding probabilities to pure wave mechanics precisely be-
cause the theory as it stands describes no chance events nor uncertainties on which
quantum probabilities might supervene. Significantly, it is just that fact that gives
29David Wallace suggested this analogy in conversation.
30One might further argue that there being determinate outcomes is also a precondition for there
being something one which probabilities over possible determinate outcomes might supervene.
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the claim that one can derive quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics
alone its magical appeal.
We routinely appeal to auxiliary background assumptions that are not stated
in the theory when we use a physical theory to explain. There is nothing wrong
with that. But if one claims to be able to deduce the standard probabilities from
a theory that says nothing about probability and describes no chance events or
uncertainties on which quantum probabilities might supervene, then one needs to
introduce probabilities and say what they concern and that will require auxiliary
assumptions. And if one insists that the standard quantum probabilities follow
from one’s theory alone, then one has a special responsibility to add the auxiliary
assumptions that do the work to one’s specification of the theory.
It is not always easy to say what principles need to be added to one’s physical
theory and what principles stand alone, but I can suggest a rule of thumb that seems
to track at least some plausible explanatory demands in such situations. One may
be comfortable not including a particular principle as part of the specification of
one’s physical theory if precisely that principle is both (1) compelling and genuinely
useful in contexts independent of the physical theory and (2) clearly applicable to
the physical theory given the usual justification for its use. Some principles, like
Bayes’ theorem, routinely pass the test. Other principles, like the principle of
indifference, may never pass the test. To get the standard quantum probabilities
from pure wave mechanics one needs a principle that connects branch amplitudes
to probabilities. To satisfy condition (1) directly, one would need a principle that
is both well motivated and useful independently of pure wave mechanics and ties
quantum-mechanical amplitudes to probabilities. I can think of no such principle.
Introducing a typicality measure as a function of branch amplitudes might be
seen as the first step in getting from amplitudes to probabilities. On this approach,
getting the standard probabilistic predictions in the context of pure wave mechanics
of the sort that DeWitt and Graham seem to have wanted would involve adding a
notion of branch typicality then adding a set of auxiliary assumptions that somehow
tie the degree to which the value of a relative record is typical to the probability of
that record being realized.
If one understands probability as a measure over possibilities where precisely
one outcome is realized, one would need to explain what it might mean for a
particular measurement record to be realized in pure wave mechanics. This is
the strategy followed for most formulations of quantum mechanics. The standard
formulation of quantum mechanics and GRW-type theories introduce a collapse
dynamics that randomly realizes one branch at the expense of others, Albert and
Loewer’s (1988) single- and many-minds theories stipulate a dynamics that de-
scribes how an observer’s experience is determined by a randomly selected branch,
and hidden-variable theories like Bohmian mechanics add a parameter and an aux-
iliary dynamics that effectively selects a branch as having been realized with epis-
temic probabilities that explain the quantum statistics.31 Of course, such additions
produce theories that are less elegant and arguably more ad hoc than pure wave
mechanics. But being worried that one’s assumptions might be considered ad hoc
31See Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1986) for a description of the original GRW theory. See
Bohm (1952) for an early description of Bohmian mechanics. Barrett (1999) provides further
details regarding how probability works in the single- and many-minds theories and in Bohmian
mechanics.
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does mean that one does not need them to get the standard quantum probabilities
in each case. If one does not understand probability as a measure over possibilities
where precisely one outcome is realized, then one needs to say how one understands
probabilities in pure wave mechanics and the sense in which the theory can thereby
be taken to account for our statistical experience.
Everett took collapse and hidden-variable theories to lack the simplicity and
naturalness of pure wave mechanics because they added something to pure wave
mechanics that it did not in fact need (1956, 152–7). But he purchases the elegance
of pure wave mechanics with weak explanatory demands. Everett specified a notion
of typicality such that the measurement records of a typical observer will exhibit
the standard quantum statistics. And he took that to be enough to explain our
statistical experience by rendering the theory empirically faithful.
Everett took his notion of typicality to put pure wave mechanics on a par with
classical statistical mechanics in how it explains our experience as typical. Insofar
as in pure wave mechanics all possible measurement records are explicitly taken to
be actual, there is an important disanalogy between the two theories that he does
not address. But the analogy is also important. While it does not allow us to infer
probabilities or expectations, Everett’s notion of typicality works with his notion
of empirical faithfulness to explain our experience. In brief, pure wave mechanics
is empirically faithful since one can find one’s experience as typical in the model of
the theory. The work done by Everett’s notion of typicality, then, is in explaining
experience. And the weakness of this explanation is indicated by the fact that it
does not allow one to infer expectations without auxiliary assumptions that go well
beyond pure wave mechanics as he characterized it.32
7. Conclusion
Since pure wave mechanics says nothing whatsoever about probability, one must
appeal to significant auxiliary assumptions to get quantum probabilities from the
theory. Much of the work in deriving the standard quantum statistics from pure
wave mechanics is done by one’s choice of a measure and how to interpret it. The
methodological point is that, given the special sort of explanatory role they play,
such auxiliary assumptions should be included in one’s specification of the theory
one takes to explain quantum probabilities.
While there is no canonical way to distinguish between one’s physical theory and
one’s beliefs and commitments more generally, there are some assumptions that one
should include in the specification of one’s theory. What these are depends on the
explanatory context. The argument here is that one has a special obligation to add
explicit assumptions regarding probabilities to pure wave mechanics because the
theory does not mention of probabilities at all and describes no chance events nor
uncertainties on which probabilities might supervene.
It is tempting to claim that pure wave mechanics alone explains the standard
quantum probabilities precisely because it sounds like magic. And it would be. It
is for this reason that one has a special explanatory burden of clearly specifying
what one is relying on get probabilistic predictions if one wants them.
32See Barrett (2011a, 2015) for detailed discussions of Everett’s notion of empirical faithfulness,
the explanatory virtue that he took pure wave mechanics mechanics to exhibit, and a comparison
of empirical faithfulness with stronger notions of empirical adequacy.
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Everett took the standard quantum statistics to be satisfactorily explained by
the fact that they are characteristic of a relative observer’s relative records in a
typical branch. His more modest explanatory goal still requires auxiliary assump-
tions, but they are weaker than what one would need to get quantum probabilities
over branches. And weaker assumptions, unsurprisingly, yield a weaker sort of
explanation.33
33I would like to thank David Wallace for discussions and Wayne Myrvold and three anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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